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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster I. Special and personal envoys, and special advisers of the Secretary-General

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2010 for six special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, and special advisers of the Secretary-General.

The estimated requirements for 2010 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to $10,646,200 (net).

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I. Financial overview

1. The estimated requirements for 2010 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to $10,646,200 (net) and requirements by mission are detailed in the table below. The mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord's Resistance Army-Affected Areas expired on 30 June 2009 and the budget proposal for the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon is now included in Cluster III.

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009			Requirements for 2010		Variance analysis 2009-2010	
Category of expenditure	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated unencumbered balance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2009	Variance
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar	1 368.0	1 364.8	3.2	1 159.1	2.3	753.2	405.9
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	5 228.2	3 172.7	2 055.8	3 279.2	—	3 603.2	(324.0)
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	2 475.8	2 453.9	21.9	1 780.2	0.5	1 332.5	447.7
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	1 213.8	495.4	718.4	690.7	1.1	628.4	62.3
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	1 542.6	1 198.4	344.2	695.0	—	852.0	(157.0)
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	—	—	—	3 042.0	27.1	—	3 042.0
Total	**11 828.4**	**8 685.2**	**3 143.5**	**10 646.2**	**31.0**	**7 169.3**	**3 476.9**

II. Special political missions

A. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar

($1,159,100)

Background, mandate and objective

2. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar was appointed in accordance with the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, most recently, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 63/245, "(a) to continue to provide his good offices and to pursue his discussions on the situation of human rights, the transition to democracy and the national reconciliation process with the Government and the people of Myanmar, including democracy and human rights groups and all relevant parties, and to offer technical assistance to the Government in this regard; and (b) to give all necessary assistance to enable the Special Adviser and the Special Rapporteur to discharge their mandates fully and effectively and in a coordinated manner".

3. Building on his engagement, which began during his visits in 2006, the Special Adviser visited Myanmar in October and November 2007 at the invitation of the Government of Myanmar following the Government's response to popular protests in August and September 2007 to find ways to resolve the crisis and to strengthen engagement and dialogue between the Government, the opposition, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and other parties to the national reconciliation process. In his discussions with the Government of Myanmar, the Special Adviser urged the Government (a) to resume dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; (b) to broaden the political process with a view to enhancing its credibility and inclusiveness; and (c) to find ways to strengthen cooperation with the United Nations in the humanitarian, socio-economic and governance areas. Initial results included measures taken by the Government to reduce tensions in the wake of the demonstrations, the release of persons detained during the demonstrations, and the appointment by the Government of a Minister for Liaison with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, followed by several meetings between them.

4. Following the completion of the National Convention in September 2007 and the establishment of a constitution-drafting committee in December 2007, the Government of Myanmar announced on 9 February 2008 that a draft constitution had been completed. The draft constitution was adopted in a national referendum in May 2008, to be followed by multi-party elections in 2010, respectively the fourth and fifth step in the Government's road map. At the invitation of the Government, the Special Adviser returned to Myanmar in March 2008 to continue his consultations on the above points with the Government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, political parties and other relevant stakeholders.

5. Throughout this period, the multidimensional nature of the situation in Myanmar has required the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser to deepen and broaden their engagement in all three key areas: political; human rights; and socio-economic, relevant to the objectives of the good offices mandate of the General Assembly. This approach has enabled the development by the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser of a comprehensive five-point agenda, endorsed by the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar and in the Security Council, as the first broadly supported common platform for engagement through the good offices with all stakeholders in Myanmar. The five-point agenda consists of (a) the release of political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; (b) the need for an enhanced, substantive and time-bound dialogue between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; (c) the creation of conditions conducive to an inclusive and credible political process leading to any elections; (d) measures to improve socio-economic conditions, including through a broad-based national mechanism; and (e) the regularization of the process of mutual engagement and cooperation between Myanmar and the good offices.

6. In August 2008 and February 2009, the Special Adviser returned to Myanmar, at the invitation of the Government, and continued consultations with all stakeholders within the guiding framework of the five-point agenda. On both occasions, the Government of Myanmar released a number of political prisoners, including the longest-serving prisoner of conscience, whose release on compassionate grounds was discussed by the Special Adviser to allow them to contribute to the political process.

7. During the same period, for the first time, the Special Adviser met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party and, separately, with representatives of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), as well as with Government counterparts.

8. As a result of the Special Adviser's consultations with the authorities, the Government indicated that the Electoral Commission, once established, may approach the United Nations for electoral assistance if required. Separately, on 29 April 2009, NLD declared its intention to participate in the Government's planned elections if, inter alia, all-inclusive free and fair general elections are held under international supervision and subject to relevant laws and regulations.

9. As a further result of the Special Adviser's consultations with the authorities, the Government agreed to explore possible areas of cooperation in the socio-economic area on a sectoral basis. Separately, at the request of the United Nations country team in Yangon, the Special Adviser was able to deploy one of his staff to the Office of the United Nations resident coordinator in Yangon twice in the context of the relief and recovery effort following cyclone Nargis to assist with the preparation and finalization of the post-Nargis joint assessment and the post-Nargis recovery and preparedness plan, in June and in October 2008, respectively, as well as with the launch of the Tripartite Core Group between Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations.

10. On 3 and 4 July 2009, the Secretary-General returned to Myanmar for a visit to discuss a range of issues with the Myanmar Government, focusing in particular on the release of political prisoners, the resumption of a substantive dialogue between the Government and opposition, and conditions conducive to a credible and inclusive political process. The Secretary-General further noted that peace and security can be affected by underlying socio-economic conditions and emphasized therefore the necessity of finding ways to address the development challenges facing the country. On his visit, the Secretary-General met twice with Senior General Than Shwe, in addition to extensive discussions with senior Government officials, political parties and armed ethnic minority groups. In his discussions, the Secretary-General made concrete proposals to encourage forward movement on the five-point agenda articulated in the context of his good offices. The Secretary-General also gave a speech to an audience of civil society, Government officials, and the diplomatic corps outlining his vision for the future of the country and the United Nations role in helping Myanmar address a range of challenges including political, humanitarian and development issues. To prepare the visit of the Secretary-General, the Special Adviser visited Myanmar on 26 and 27 June 2009. The Special Adviser also accompanied the Secretary-General to Myanmar.

11. The Secretary-General, on 13 July 2009, briefed the Security Council, at its request, on his visit to Myanmar. On behalf of the Secretary-General, the Special Adviser also convened a meeting of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar on 8 July to discuss the outcomes of the visit of the Secretary-General. On 5 August 2009, the Secretary-General convened another meeting of the Group of Friends to personally brief it on his visit and discuss latest developments in Myanmar.

12. On 14 May 2009, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was taken from her home in Yangon and charged with violating the terms of her house arrest based on the intrusion of an

American national in her property from 3 to 5 May. Throughout her trial, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi maintained she had not broken the law. She was sentenced on 11 August 2009 to three years of hard labour, a sentence that was commuted immediately by the Government to 18 months under house arrest, albeit under slightly relaxed conditions. On the same day, the Secretary-General issued a statement deploring the decision and reiterating that unless she and all political prisoners in Myanmar were released and allowed to participate in free and fair elections, the credibility of the political process would remain in doubt. The United States national was sentenced to seven years of hard labour, but on 17 August 2009 was deported on humanitarian grounds, following a visit to Myanmar by a United States senator.

13. The Security Council issued a press statement on 13 August, expressing its serious concern at the conviction and sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and its political impact, noting the decision of the Government of Myanmar to reduce her sentence and urging the Government of Myanmar to take further measures to create the necessary conditions for a genuine dialogue with her and all concerned parties and ethnic groups in order to achieve an inclusive national reconciliation. The members of the Security Council reiterated their support for the good offices role of the Secretary-General, and affirmed their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Myanmar.

14. In the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser have remained closely engaged with key interested Member States. In addition to the Special Adviser's consultations with Government counterparts in capitals, this has included nine meetings of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar since its establishment in December 2007, convened and chaired by the Secretary-General, including the first high-level ministerial meeting of the Group on 27 September 2008.

15. In this context, the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser continue to encourage the Myanmar Government, opposition groups, and all other stakeholders to engage with the United Nations on the above agenda with a view to facilitating efforts towards democratic transition and national reconciliation. From experience gained around the world, the United Nations has learned that constitutional and electoral processes in any transitional context can have either a divisive or a unifying effect, depending on the level of preparation and the degree of domestic buy-in into the process. In this regard, 2010 will be a critical year for the Secretary-General's good offices engagement to work with all concerned to help facilitate dialogue and efforts at creating conditions conducive to a credible and inclusive political process leading to any elections, as planned by the Government. Equally important to the prospects of durable peace and sustainable transition to civilian and democratic government, as reflected by the civilian unrest of 2007 and the impact of cyclone Nargis, is the need to address the urgent socio-economic challenges facing Myanmar and its people, building on the cooperation developed thus far between Myanmar and the United Nations, including in the context of post-Nargis reconstruction. The Secretary-General has also consistently emphasized that none of the challenges facing Myanmar today — political, humanitarian and development — can be addressed in isolation and the failure to address them with equal attention could undermine the prospects for peace, democracy and development.

16. In the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices mandate, the Office of the Special Adviser has benefited since 2008 from extrabudgetary support provided by some Member States. This additional support has provided, under short notice, the necessary capacity and expertise in support of the efforts of the Secretary-General to deepen and broaden engagement between Myanmar and the United Nations, while enabling a comprehensive and results-oriented approach to the implementation of the good offices mandate, in the political, human rights, socio-economic and humanitarian areas. In this process, the additional support has enabled sustained engagement with a wide range of stakeholders and interested parties, both inside and outside the country, including with democracy and human rights groups. The added capacity has also made it possible to enhance coordination and facilitate information-sharing among relevant United Nations agencies, offices and funds, as well as to build partnerships with specialized agencies and organizations working with Myanmar. The scheduled expiration of this support in December 2009, however, will create a serious capacity deficit that could potentially undermine the effective implementation of the good offices mandate at the same time as Myanmar is expected to enter a crucial phase in its political process with the first elections in over 20 years. Given the multidimensional nature of cooperation between Myanmar and the Office of the Special Adviser pursuant to the General Assembly resolution, maintaining the existing capacity in support of the Secretary-General's good offices through 2010 is imperative in order to ensure the continued effective engagement of the Special Adviser in the implementation of the good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General at this critical juncture.

Cooperation with other entities

17. In implementing the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, the Office of the Special Adviser cooperates and works closely with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations resident coordinator and the country team in Yangon, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in Bangkok, as well as other entities of the United Nations system. It has become established practice for the Special Adviser to meet with members of the country team when he visits Myanmar and for the United Nations resident coordinator and other members of the country team to meet regularly with the Office of the Special Adviser when they visit Headquarters. The Special Adviser also consults with relevant United Nations officials and entities to ensure coordinated engagement by the various parts of the United Nations system on Myanmar. In this context, the Office of the Special Adviser established the Myanmar working group as a regular inter-agency framework bringing together different elements of the United Nations system working on Myanmar to ensure coherence and synergies as well as information-sharing.

18. As part of the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Special Adviser also consults regularly with key interested Member States, including through visits to regional and neighbouring countries and through focused discussions in the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar. It has also become

established practice for the Special Adviser to report to the President of the General Assembly upon return from his visits to Myanmar. The Secretary-General remains committed to providing his good offices and to pursuing discussions with the Government and the people of Myanmar on the situation of human rights, the national reconciliation process and transition to democracy in Myanmar.

19. Throughout 2009, the personal engagement by the Secretary-General and the ongoing work of the Special Adviser have ensured, on the one hand, forward momentum towards the objectives set out in the General Assembly resolution, within the guiding framework of the five-point agenda endorsed by the Group of Friends and in the Security Council, and, on the other hand, continued broad international support for the Secretary-General's good offices among Member States, including through the Group of Friends.

Performance information for 2008-2009

20. Accomplishments for 2008-2009 were expected in progress towards: (a) national reconciliation; (b) the restoration of democracy; and (c) improvement of the socio-economic situation and the advancement of good governance.

21. Under national reconciliation, 26 political prisoners were released following the visits of the Special Adviser in August 2008 and February 2009, including the country's longest-serving prisoner of conscience. Two meetings were held between the Government and NLD in 2008. However, other political prisoners were arrested and sentenced in 2008 and 2009, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest. The dialogue between the Government and NLD has not continued since 2008. In 2009, the Government has held an estimated seven meetings with armed ethnic minority groups.

22. Under restoration of democracy, the Government, to date, has not formed an independent elections commission, published guidelines for the registration of political parties or issued an electoral law. With the exception of its Yangon office, NLD was not permitted to reopen its offices throughout the country.

23. Under improvement of the socio-economic situation and the advancement of good governance, discussions are continuing between the Myanmar Government and the good offices on a policy dialogue to address socio-economic issues.

Planning assumptions for 2010

24. It is envisaged that the Secretary-General will continue to provide his good offices in 2010, and to pursue his discussions on the situation of human rights and the transition to democracy with the Government and the people of Myanmar, including all relevant parties to the national reconciliation process in Myanmar, and to offer technical assistance to the Government in this regard. In the light of the Government announcement of its plan to hold multiparty elections next year for the first time in 20 years, 2010 will be a critical year for Myanmar and, in that context, expectations within the international community of the good offices of the Secretary-General will be raised to a new level and engagement with the Government of Myanmar may significantly increase in 2010. In this connection, following his visit to Myanmar in June 2009, the Secretary-General expressed his commitment to broaden and deepen the scope of his good offices to address the challenges ahead.

25. The good offices efforts of the Secretary-General would no longer be required once national reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar have been achieved based on the participation of all the parties concerned and in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. Until that objective is achieved, it is anticipated that the General Assembly, during its sixty-fourth session, will extend the mandate of the Secretary-General to continue to pursue his good offices role to facilitate the process.

26. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To advance the national reconciliation and democratization process in Myanmar.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
(a) Progress towards national reconciliation	(a) (i) Release of political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: 6 Estimate 2009: 20 Target 2010: 200 (ii) Increased political consultations between the Government and opposition groups, including ethnic minority groups *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: 2 Estimate 2009: 7 Target 2010: 20
(b) Progress towards transition to democracy	(b) (i) Establishment of an independent electoral commission *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 0 Target 2010: 1 (ii) Issuance of sound electoral related laws *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 0 Target 2010: 4

	(iii) Conduct of inclusive and credible elections *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: not applicable Target 2010: 1
(c) Progress towards improvement of the human rights situation	(c) (i) Removal of legal restrictions on the freedom of expression and assembly *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: not applicable Target 2010: 4 Number of capacity-building programmes conducted in order to increase the human rights capacity of the members of the armed forces, police, and prison forces *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: not applicable Target 2010: 3
(d) Progress towards the improvement of socio-economic conditions	(d) (i) Number of broad-based dialogues to improve socio-economic conditions *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: not applicable Target 2010: 1 (ii) Pilot sectoral economic policy dialogue *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 1 Target 2010: 2

Outputs

- Regular engagement and consultations with the authorities of Myanmar and other relevant parties on all issues in connection with the national reconciliation process
- Regular engagement with the authorities of Myanmar, democracy and human rights groups, opposition political parties on the democratic transition
- Regular engagement and consultations with key interested Member States, including countries of the region and neighbouring States to develop common approaches in addressing the situation in Myanmar
- Annual report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and other briefings as requested
- Briefings by the Special Adviser to the General Assembly and the Security Council, as requested
- Technical assistance to the Government, upon request, to ensure a credible, transparent and inclusive electoral process
- Technical assistance to the Government, upon request, in close coordination with other relevant parts of the United Nations system, to establish a framework for a broad-based socio-economic dialogue

External factors

27. The good offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through the Special Adviser, is expected to achieve its objective provided that the Government of Myanmar and other relevant parties to the national reconciliation process have the willingness and commitment to reach a political solution and that the international community, especially the countries of the region, provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008-31 December 2009 variance			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
	Appropriations	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2009*	*Variance*
Category of expenditure	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	846.5	807.4	39.1	809.3	—	501.1	308.2
Operational costs	521.5	557.4	(35.9)	349.8	2.3	252.1	97.7
Total requirements	**1 368.0**	**1 364.8**	**3.2**	**1 159.1**	**2.3**	**753.2**	**405.9**

28. The estimated requirements in 2010 for the Special Adviser amount to $1,159,100 net ($1,281,600 gross). This amount would provide for the salaries and common staff costs of three existing positions, including the establishment of two additional positions (P-4 and P-3) of Political Affairs Officer ($809,300), consultants ($24,800), travel of staff ($228,600), facilities and infrastructure ($71,500), communications ($10,200), information technology ($7,600), and other supplies, services and equipment ($7,100).

29. The increased requirements in 2010 are mainly owed to (a) the request for the establishment of two additional positions of Political Affairs Officer (P-4 and P-3) to assist the Special Adviser in his intensified engagement related to the anticipated election in Myanmar during 2010; (b) inclusion of the provision for consultants who will assist the Office of the Special Adviser on the development of inputs for the 2010 programme, including the development of a framework for broad-based dialogue on socio-economic issues, and appropriate assistance in the electoral process and rule of law area; and (c) provision for the rental of premises, as the office in the Secretariat will move to a new location during 2009. The increase will be partly offset by reduced requirements for official travel.

30. The anticipated unencumbered balance is owed to the savings in staff costs, as the P-4 position was encumbered at a lower level (P-3) for a period of seven months, partially offset by the unforeseen requirements for consultancy services required by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General during 2009.

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	**4**	—	1	**5**	—	—	—	**5**
Change	—	—	—	—	—	**1**	**1**	—	**2**	—	—	**2**	—	—	—	**2**

31. In light of the current developments in Myanmar and the need for intensified engagement by the Special Adviser in anticipation of the planned election in 2010, an increase in the staffing structure and capacity is requested for: (a) one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) to monitor socio-economic and governance situations and underlying conditions to the domestic political context; and (b) one Political Affairs Officer (P-3) to monitor human rights situation and related developments in close coordination with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

B. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

($3,279,200)

Background, mandate and objective

32. The question of Cyprus has been on the United Nations agenda for over four decades and remains unresolved despite numerous initiatives undertaken by the United Nations and the international community to support Cypriot efforts towards a comprehensive settlement. The most recent large-scale United Nations effort to assist in the efforts aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem culminated in separate simultaneous referenda on the island in April 2004, in which the Comprehensive Settlement Plan put forward to voters did not pass. A period of relative inactivity followed, until the United Nations in 2006 began to step up once more its level of engagement.

33. The February 2008 elections in the Republic of Cyprus brought to power Demetris Christofias, who, immediately upon assuming office, expressed his intention to reach out to the Turkish Cypriots and their leadership. For his part, Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, expressed hope for the start of a new era in Cyprus. On 21 March 2008, the two leaders met and agreed on a path towards a comprehensive settlement. The agreement also entailed the establishment of a number of working groups to consider the core issues pertaining to an eventual settlement plan, and of technical committees to seek immediate solutions to every day problems arising from the division of the island.

34. On 14 April 2008, the representatives of the two leaders requested the United Nations in writing to "provide the required infrastructure and personnel support to allow the parties to carry forward the process" leading to a comprehensive settlement. More specifically, at meetings between the representatives of the leaders and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), it was agreed that the United Nations would assist the parties through the provision of facilitators, meeting venues and logistical support.

35. On 23 May 2008, the leaders issued a joint statement reconfirming their commitment to a "bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions". They also said in the statement that the "partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status". At their meeting of 1 July 2008, the leaders issued a joint statement stating that they had discussed the issues of single sovereignty and citizenship.

36. In his letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456), the Secretary-General informed the Council of his intention to designate Alexander Downer as his Special Adviser on Cyprus as from 14 July 2008. The President of the Council, in his letter of 14 July 2008 (S/2008/457), informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of his intention.

37. In their joint statement of 25 July 2008, Mr. Christofias and Mr. Talat publicly welcomed the appointment of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General, whose mandate is to assist the parties in the conduct of fully fledged negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement.

Performance information for 2008-2009

38. During the preparatory phase (April-July 2008), six Working Groups (on governance and power-sharing, European Union matters, security and guarantees, territory, property, and economic matters) convened 115 times, while the seven Technical Committees (on crime and criminal matters, economic and commercial matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health, and environment matters) convened 148 times. The Working Groups identified areas of convergence and disagreement, while preparing options on the more sensitive elements for the two leaders to consider, once formal negotiations began. In the period June-July 2008, the leaders' representatives announced 22 confidence-building measures in the areas of cultural heritage, environment, health, crisis management, and crimes and criminal matters, formulated by the Technical Committees, aimed at easing the daily life of Cypriots across the entire island and

instructed that they should be implemented. The preparatory phase and the progress achieved within the Working Groups and Technical Committees paved the way for fully fledged negotiations.

39. On 3 September 2008, the leaders begun fully fledged negotiations under United Nations auspices aimed at the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. Since then the leaders have maintained a steady pace of almost one meeting per week focusing on issues related to governance and power-sharing, property, European Union matters, economic matters, security and guarantees, and territory. All meetings of the leaders have taken place in the presence of either the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General, or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, or both.

40. On 12 December 2008, the Security Council adopted resolution 1847 (2008), extending the mandate of UNFICYP to 15 June 2009. The resolution urged the parties to fully exploit the opportunity of the negotiations, including by intensifying the momentum of the talks, preserving the current atmosphere of trust and goodwill, and engaging in the process in a constructive and open manner.

41. On 22 December 2008, the leaders issued a joint statement, reaffirming their strong commitment and resolve to finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. In early May 2009, the leaders publicly committed, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to intensify their efforts further, not least through additional meetings at the level of their representatives.

42. In parallel to the fully fledged negotiations, some of the Technical Committees have continued to meet, albeit at a slower pace compared to the preparatory phase of the talks. An additional measure was agreed by the leaders in January 2009 in the area of cultural heritage. On 14 April 2009, the leaders agreed to the implementation of 4 of the 23 confidence-building measures formulated by the Technical Committees and agreed by the leaders. UNDP has earmarked funds to support such initiatives.

Cooperation with other entities

43. In order to ensure coherent and effective support to the peace effort, there is a high-level of synergy among the United Nations family. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General acts as Deputy to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on issues relating to the Secretary-General's good offices. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General continues to articulate, and is the conduit for, support provided by UNFICYP and the United Nations country team to the Secretary-General's good offices.

44. With regard to UNFICYP, the substantive pillars (civil affairs, the military and civilian police) support the efforts of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General through expertise and institutional knowledge, in particular by assisting the parties in devising and implementing confidence-building measures. UNFICYP is also providing administrative and infrastructure support to the office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General.

45. Regarding the United Nations country team, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General coordinates expertise from various sources, including the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and United Nations agencies, inter alia, UNDP, in order to contribute to efforts to create an enabling environment for fully

fledged negotiations. In sum, all United Nations efforts are directed, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General acting in his capacity as Deputy to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, to support the Secretary-General's good offices and the final expected outcome of a mutually agreed comprehensive settlement.

Planning assumptions for 2010

46. It is expected that the process of negotiations will intensify towards the end of 2009 and early 2010. In this regard, it is anticipated that the leaders and the representatives will increase the frequency of their meetings held under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General will also increasingly engage regional and international stakeholders on substantive issues in support of the process.

47. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
Progress in the fully fledged negotiations, towards a comprehensive settlement	(i) Parties reaching agreement on core and substantive issues *Performance measures*: Increased numbers of meetings between the leaders Actual 2008: 18 Estimate 2009: 50 Target 2010: 50 (ii) Intensified discussions in the Technical Committees and Working Groups, as well as at the level of the representatives of the two leaders *Performance measures*: (a) Increased number of meetings between the representatives of the leaders Actual 2008: 24 Estimate 2009: 90 Target 2010: 100 (b) Increased number of meetings of the Working Groups and Technical Committees Actual 2008: 282 Estimate 2009: 500 Target 2010: 800

(iii) Implementation of confidence-building measures formulated by the Technical Committees and approved by the leaders and other agreed measures

Performance measures:

Actual 2008: 2 measures

Estimate 2009: 10 measures (cumulative)

Target 2010: 23 measures (cumulative)

Outputs

- Facilitation of fully fledged negotiations at the level of leaders
- Advisory services at the highest level on substantive issues in support of full-fledged negotiations
- Briefings to the diplomatic community on the island and special envoys for the Cyprus question on a monthly basis
- In-depth assessment of the political situation in Cyprus and in the region through quarterly visits
- Facilitation of the six Working Groups and the seven Technical Committees on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues
- Meetings with the Cyprus press (50); press releases (60); establishment and maintenance of contact with the media
- Reports to and briefings of the Security Council (4)

External factors

48. The objective would be achieved provided that the current political will of the leaders prevails and that there is continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008-31 December 2009 variance			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriations* (1)	*Estimated expenditures* (2)	*Savings (deficit)* (3)=(1)-(2)	*Total requirements* (4)	*Non-recurrent requirements* (5)	*Total requirements 2009* (6)	*Variance* (7)=(4)-(5)
Civilian personnel costs	3 522.5	1 723.9	1 798.6	2 288.6	—	2 736.1	(447.5)
Operational costs	1 706.0	1 448.8	257.2	990.6	—	867.1	123.5
Total requirements	**5 228.5**	**3 172.7**	**2 055.8**	**3 279.2**	**—**	**3 603.2**	**(324.0)**

49. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus for 2010 amount to $3,279,200 net ($3,625,000 gross). This amount would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 19 existing positions ($2,288,600), consultants ($212,400), travel of

staff ($394,000), facilities and infrastructure ($88,100), ground transportation ($106,000) and air transportation ($8,400), communications ($123,200), information technology ($18,400), and other supplies, services and equipment ($40,100).

50. The reduced requirements in 2010 are mainly owed to: (a) proposed abolition of one P-5 position; (b) the decrease in the post adjustment applicable to Cyprus; and (c) reduced requirements for operational costs as the majority of the acquisition of office and furniture equipment was completed in 2009, and some of the logistical support will be provided free of charge by UNFICYP.

51. The anticipated unencumbered balance in the biennium 2008-2009 is mainly owed to: (a) a higher actual vacancy rate than projected; and (b) the reduced requirements for operational costs as some of the logistical support included in the approved budget were provided by UNFICYP.

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2009	1	—	—	1	4	5	—	—	**11**	2	4	17	—	3	—	**20**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	1	3	5	—	—	**10**	2	4	16	—	3	—	**19**
Change	—	—	—	—	**(1)**	—	—	—	**(1)**	—	—	**(1)**	—	—	—	**(1)**

52. The total staffing requirements for the Office in 2010 will be reduced from 20 to 19 positions, reflecting the proposed abolition of one P-5. Owing to the difficulty experienced by the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General during 2009 in identifying a suitable candidate with experience in property, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General decided that the Office could benefit from consultancy services for their requirements of an experienced property expert.

C. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

($1,780,200)

Background, mandate and objective

53. Following the Security Council's invitation to the Secretary-General, in its resolution 1366 (2001), to refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Secretary-General, in his letter dated 12 July 2004 (S/2004/567), informed the President of the Council of his decision to appoint a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. In his reply of 13 July 2004 (S/2004/568), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's decision.

54. The Secretary-General listed the Special Adviser's responsibilities as follows:

(a) to collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide;

(b) to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide;

(c) to make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide;

(d) to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.

55. The primary normative reference of the work of the Special Adviser is drawn from, in addition to the exchange of letters, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the wider body of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law; and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, including the 2005 World Summit Outcome, as adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/1.

56. The Special Adviser understands and implements his mandate as that of a catalyst within the United Nations system and more broadly within the international community, in order to alert of the potential of genocide in a particular country or region, to make recommendations towards preventing or halting it, and to open up space for partners to undertake preventive action in accordance with their mandates and responsibilities under international law.

Performance information for 2008-2009

57. During 2008-2009, the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide refined its strategy and methodology, following extensive consultations with United Nations departments and programmes, Member States and experts. In particular, it developed a framework for analysis to identify situations that may lead to genocide. The framework has received favourable reviews from colleagues within the United Nations system and members of the Human Rights Council, where it was presented as part of the relevant report of the Secretary-General as requested by that body (see A/HRC/10/30). In 2009, the Special Adviser is in the process of further improving the framework, with the input of other United Nations departments and programmes, as well as experts in the field of genocide prevention, through a series of workshops.

58. The Special Adviser conducted a mission to the Great Lakes region in late 2008, with emphasis on the situation in North Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Upon his return, he briefed the Secretary-General and other senior United Nations officials. The report on that mission was made available to the Security Council (see S/2009/151). He remained seized of a number of other situations that involved either follow-up to earlier actions, such as in the case of Kenya and the Sudan, or diplomatic work of a preventive nature.

59. The Office of the Special Adviser has worked during 2009 towards the establishment of an information management system, updating the Special Adviser daily on developments globally on the basis of information made available by the operational departments and agencies. This system forms the backbone of the global monitoring and early warning capacities of the Office and supports the creation of an interactive database to enhance its early warning capacity.

60. With regard to outreach activities, the Office published and distributed within the United Nations system around the world, with the help of the Department of Public Information, a booklet providing information on the mandate of the Special Adviser, and created its own website (www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser). Both the Special Adviser and his staff have been active in participating in workshops and conferences on genocide prevention to raise awareness of the mandate and to discuss means to improve early warning capacity of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. For instance, the Special Adviser and his staff participated in a conference organized by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with input from his Office, which was significant in the strengthening of relations between his mandate and that of the High Commissioner and members of treaty bodies and human rights special rapporteurs.

61. The Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention held its annual meeting in October 2008. The Committee discussed developments in the methodology and strategy of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, developments regarding the responsibility to protect and the partnership with the Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect and the future composition and role of the Committee itself. Close contact has been maintained with the Chairman and members of the Advisory Committee through the year.

62. In 2009 the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has been utilizing the framework of analysis to serve its global monitoring, analysis and communication of concerns. It has also established a system of collecting information, monitored and evaluated a project by pro bono independent experts of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights on a compilation of the legal norms related to the prevention of genocide, issued its first report to the Security Council, strengthened its ties across the United Nations system, and significantly broadened its outreach activities. Of the expected outputs in 2009, those partially achieved were: (a) the establishment of a roster of country-specific experts on genocide prevention; (b) the envisioned public advocacy campaign; and (c) the number of country missions that were initially planned. Regarding the first two, given the complexities and sensitivities surrounding the mandate, including issues such as how to distinguish the prevention of genocide from the prevention of conflict or human rights violations and avoid systemic overlaps, the Office has needed more time to consolidate its conceptual foundation and methods of work and communication than it originally expected. Regarding the third, missions to countries to address specific situations have proven to be extremely difficult to arrange, as Governments resent any implication that genocide might be a possibility in their respective country.

Cooperation with other entities

63. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide continues to operate in close collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF and UNDP, and to deepen its exchanges and collaboration with the European Union and the African Union. Moreover, the Special Adviser participates in the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the Inter-agency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action, providing participants with guidance on genocide prevention and requesting information relevant to his mandate, discussions of the Policy Committee on issues and situations that had a bearing upon his mandate, and a number of interdepartmental task forces and working groups on issues of concern to the mandate, including several pertaining to specific peacekeeping operations. At the request of the Human Rights Council, the Special Adviser contributes to the report of the Secretary-General on the efforts of the United Nations in genocide prevention and participated in an oral presentation and interactive dialogue with the Human Rights Council.

64. As regards the Security Council, to which the Special Adviser is to report through the Secretary-General, the Special Adviser has maintained individual contacts with the members of the Council and has met since September 2008 with every incoming President to discuss issues relating to his mandate. At the request of one Council presidency he provided an informal briefing on his mission to the Great Lakes region.

Planning assumptions for 2010

65. In 2010, the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will continue to actively seek engagement with Member States to promote cooperation, dialogue and capacities, with a view to preventing genocide anywhere in the world, in identifying best practices from those countries that have averted such mass atrocities. To this end, the Office will focus on five areas of work: raising awareness, collecting information, identifying concerns, communicating concerns and recommendations, and developing capacities to prevent genocide.

Raising awareness

66. Raising awareness about generic and specific situations is a preventive measure in itself. To achieve this goal, the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will further develop its strategy to enhance awareness about the mandate and to encourage a climate receptive to prevention. Regional consultations have been found to be particularly effective, not only as "peer review" forums, but also because they provide an opportunity to reflect on similar concerns and share best practices. The Office will attend expert conferences on genocide prevention and related themes, as they provide a unique opportunity to contribute the unique expertise of the Office, enhance information exchange and networking with key actors, and ensure that the Office can benefit from the expertise of third parties, including Government representatives. The Office will continue to improve its website; an integrated website on the prevention of genocide with the respective projects of the Department of Public Information on Rwanda and on the Holocaust remembrance is planned. It will also share with OHCHR field offices, via a Bulletin, summaries of its activities. A revised second edition of the Office booklet on the mandate of the Special Adviser is foreseen in 2010.

Collecting information

67. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will monitor potential crisis situations worldwide, including country, regional and thematic situations. Monitoring will draw upon relevant human rights, political, development and humanitarian information, with particular attention to structural factors (such as the existence of diverse ethnic, national, religious or racial groups, or a climate of impunity) and potential triggering events (such as the run-up to elections or the imposition of a state of emergency). The Office will seek, and consider, information provided by Member States, the United Nations and other sources, where available and appropriate. The Office will have access to relevant United Nations information sources and meetings, as needed, including the reports of the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, and special procedures. Monitoring will be conducted in close consultation with relevant United Nations partners and with the concerned Member States.

Identifying concerns

68. The Office will analyse specific situations through in-depth consideration of all relevant information, consultations with the relevant Member States, and regional organizations. When appropriate and in consultation with relevant State and regional authorities, the Special Adviser may visit or may direct a member of his staff to visit a specific country and meet with officials, the United Nations country team or other actors, as may be required. Working files on different situations will be prepared and updated as necessary. A roster of country-specific experts will be created, with whom the Office will be in a position to consult to deepen its insights.

Communicating concerns and recommendations

69. As needed, the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will present situations of concern with pertinent recommendations to the Secretary-General and other senior officials. The Office will continue to enhance the consistency and frequency of its participation in senior policy discussions on country and thematic issues within the Secretariat. In addition, the Office may conduct advocacy in support of prevention, including towards the State authorities and the international community at the United Nations. The Office may carry out missions to countries where the involvement of the Special Adviser is considered of particular significance with respect to the prevention of genocide. Noting that prevention has been most successful where a host State agrees to take prompt preventive action and where the international community reaches political consensus on the problems and the response, the Office will use advocacy to encourage a political environment that supports prevention through constructive engagement rather than confrontation. The Advisory Committee, at its annual fall session, will examine situations of concern and advise on appropriate methods of communication on them. Reports and briefings to the Security Council will be given as appropriate.

70. A strategic contribution by the Office will be to ensure that risks of large-scale violence are understood and accorded the appropriate priority by both the Secretariat, at the corresponding senior level, and by Member States at the United Nations.

Developing capacities to prevent genocide

71. The mandate of the Special Adviser includes liaising with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information regarding genocide and related crimes. A major new sector planned for the remainder of 2009 and for the year 2010 will include a comprehensive training project on genocide prevention. The project will entail close corroboration with the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, OHCHR, other United Nations partners, training institutes and think tanks, and international criminal tribunals. The project will include components on induction training on early warning and other preventive tools for civilians serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The Office will carry out an assessment survey planned for the second half of 2009 to assess capacity of United Nations field missions before implementing the project. The Office will work closely with experts to prepare a module with a series of training manuals that will also be made available as an online training tool for United Nations field missions. A roster of expert trainers will be established and called upon to organize seminars and workshops to train field officers alongside the Office staff. In 2010, the Office will also conduct training for trainers in United Nations field missions on prevention and will develop a training guide. Another significant component aims to enhance capacity of domestic State institutions to prevent genocide; the Office will work together with Governments at their invitation and provide expertise on treaty ratification, to review domestic legislation on print and speech media and rights of minorities and military training manuals to ensure compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law standards with a specific focus on genocide prevention. It is expected that in 2010 the Office, with the help of experts working pro bono, will complete the compilation of all relevant legal principles on the prevention of genocide. These principles will be used in conjunction with the framework of analysis.

72. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide are presented below.

Objective: To alert to the potential of genocide in a particular country or region and to make recommendations towards preventing or halting it.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
(a) Greater awareness by State, non-State and regional actors of the importance of prevention and situations and conditions that could lead to genocide	(a) (i) Number of State, non-State and regional actors engaged in analysing indicators of massive and serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law of an ethnic, racial, national or religious character, including the development of possible mitigating factors *Performance measures*: 2008: 25 actors Estimate 2009: 30 actors Target 2010: 35 actors

	(ii) Number of visits on the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide website *Performance measures*: 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 25,000 visits Target 2010: 35,000 visits
(b) Increased capacity of United Nations operations, regional organizations and Member States to prevent genocide and address risk factors and precursors of genocide	(b) (i) Finalization of a pilot project for the training of civilian personnel for United Nations missions, state officials and civil society on the prevention of genocide and related violence *Performance measures*: 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: one pilot project Target 2010: one fully fledged, comprehensive training project available online (ii) Number of United Nations field staff to benefit from the training project, including online training materials *Performance measures*: 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 200 Target 2010: 400

Outputs

- 12,000 copies of the second edition of the booklet published and widely disseminated among United Nations actors, especially in the field, Member States and regional organizations
- Website properly maintained and regularly updated
- Framework for analysis widely accepted within the United Nations as the appropriate tool for channelling concerns related to the prevention of genocide
- Interactive internal database with information on possible precursors
- Comprehensive system of the collection of information and global monitoring of situations that could lead to genocide
- Daily compilation of monitoring results
- Reports or notes to the Secretary-General and/or the Security Council (4)
- Briefings to the Security Council (3)

- Roster of experts on country-specific situations (1)
- Internal monthly risk assessments (12)
- Participation in interdisciplinary familiarization and confidence-building missions to regions of tension or conflict
- Compilation of the legal norms relating to the prevention of genocide (1)
- Comprehensive training project, including training materials, pool of trainers, and eight training workshops and seminars organized (1)

External factors

73. The objectives would be achieved, provided that there is political will on the part of members of the Security Council to engage with the Special Adviser in order to consider and, as necessary, act upon his analysis and recommendations; that there is willingness among Member States that are host to critical events to allow access to and engage with the Special Adviser; and that there is goodwill and active involvement of regional and other organizations.

Analysis of resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008-31 December 2009 variance			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
Category of expenditure	*Appropriations* (1)	*Estimated expenditures* (2)	*Savings (deficit)* (3)=(1)-(2)	*Total requirements* (4)	*Non-recurrent requirements* (5)	*Total requirements 2009* (6)	*Variance* (7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	1 780.0	1 772.6	7.4	1 077.9	—	979.7	98.2
Operational costs	695.8	681.3	14.5	702.3	0.5	352.8	349.5
Total requirements	**2 475.8**	**2 453.9**	**21.9**	**1 780.2**	**0.5**	**1 332.5**	**447.7**

74. The estimated requirements for the Special Adviser for 2010 amount to $1,780,200 net ($1,948,800 gross). This would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of six existing positions ($1,077,900), consultancy services ($90,200), official travel ($294,700), facilities and infrastructure ($280,700), ground transportation ($2,400), communications ($9,800), information technology ($13,500) and other supplies, services and equipment ($11,000).

75. Increased requirements of $447,700 in 2010 are mainly owed to: (a) changes in the standard salary costs; (b) additional requirements for consultants and travel to provide training on genocide awareness; and (c) facilities and infrastructure, for the alteration and renovation related to the planned move to a new location in 2010 based on the recommendation by the Department of Safety and Security for the lease of the Alcoa Building not to be renewed in view of security concerns in relation to the presence of a commercial garage under the building.

76. The anticipated unencumbered balance of $21,900 in the period 2008-2009 is mainly owed to the lower requirement for official travel as a result of fewer trips undertaken by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General and his support staff and

the non-utilization of the provision for the acquisition of information technology equipment.

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	**4**	—	2	**6**	—	—	—	6
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	**4**	—	2	**6**	—	—	—	6
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

77. The staffing requirements for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide for 2010 will remain unchanged.

D. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

($690,700)

Background, mandate and objective

78. In his letter dated 6 January 2009 (S/2009/19), the Secretary-General appointed Christopher Ross as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, and indicated to the Council that the Envoy would work with the parties and the neighbouring States on the basis of Security Council resolution 1813 (2008) and earlier resolutions, and taking into account the progress made to date in order to achieve a just, durable and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Following that communication, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General, in his letter dated 8 January 2009 (S/2009/20), that his decision to appoint his Personal Envoy had been brought to the attention of the members of the Council and that the Council had taken note of the intention of the Secretary-General.

79. On 30 April 2008, the Security Council, in its resolution 1813 (2008), called upon the parties to continue to negotiate without preconditions under the auspices of the Secretary-General. The Council endorsed the recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties were essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations, and called upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.

Performance information for 2008-2009

80. In implementation of that resolution, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General has held extensive consultations with the representatives of the two parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario), as well as with the representatives of the neighbouring countries Algeria and Mauritania, and with the representatives of other interested countries. In addition, he undertook two visits to the region from 17 to 28 February

2009 and from 22 June to 1 July 2009, for in-depth consultations on the current positions of the parties and on ways to move the process of negotiations into a more substantive phase. Informal negotiations among the parties were held in Austria in July 2009.

81. By mid-2009, having carried out two missions to the region and numerous consultations with representatives of the parties, neighbouring States and members of the Group of Friends, the Personal Envoy informed the Secretary-General that the positions of the parties remained far apart. During the second half of 2009, informal meetings will be held to help the parties engage with each other in a cooperative, instead of confrontational, mode. The main objective of these meetings is to reach a working understanding between the parties so that in the fifth round they would enter into a more intense and substantial phase of negotiations, as called for by the Security Council. The fifth round of negotiations is expected to take place before the end of 2009 in Manhasset, New York.

Cooperation with other entities

82. The Personal Envoy reports on his findings and recommendations to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Both the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations closely coordinate policy initiatives and provide support to the Personal Envoy, including through periodic updates on political developments in the region and on the situation on the ground, as well as political analysis and advice. The Department of Field Support provides logistical support during the visits of the Personal Envoy to the region.

Planning assumptions in 2010

83. During 2010, the Personal Envoy will continue to hold consultations to facilitate the negotiations with the Government of Morocco and the leadership of the Frente Polisario for reaching a political solution on the question of Western Sahara. The Personal Envoy will also continue to hold consultations with the neighbouring States Algeria and Mauritania and to coordinate closely with interested member States both in New York and in the capitals.

84. The work of the Personal Envoy for Western Sahara will be concluded once the parties reach a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

85. The objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievements of the Personal Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
Progress towards the comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara	(i) The parties participate in, and contribute fruitfully to, the negotiations towards the settlement of the question. *Performance measures*: Number of meetings between the parties for negotiations of an agreement 2008: 2 Estimate 2009: 3 Target 2010: 3 (ii) Agreement reached or not reached *Performance measure*: 2008: No Estimate 2009: No Target 2010: Yes

Outputs

- Negotiations between the parties concerned, and political consultations with the parties, neighbouring States and the international community
- Reports to and briefings of the Security Council

External factors

86. The efforts under the good offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through his Personal Envoy, are expected to achieve their objective provided that the two parties have the willingness and commitment to reach a political solution, and that the neighbouring States and the international community provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

Resource requirements
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008-31 December 2009 variance			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
	Appropriations	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2009*	*Variance*
Category of expenditure	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	289.6	201.9	87.7	192.9	—	158.7	34.2
Operational costs	924.2	293.5	630.7	497.8	1.1	469.7	28.1
Total requirements	**1 213.8**	**495.4**	**718.4**	**690.7**	**1.1**	**628.4**	**62.3**

87. The estimated requirements in 2010 for the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara amount to $690,700 net ($741,100 gross). This amount would provide for international staff costs ($192,900), consultants ($124,900), official travel ($170,800), facilities and infrastructure ($14,300), communications ($2,000), information technology ($2,300), and other supplies, services and equipment ($183,500).

88. The additional requirements of $62,300 in 2010 are mainly owed to: (a) higher standard salary costs in 2010; (b) increase in consultancy services to assist the Personal Envoy in the consultations and negotiations to respond to the complex and multifaceted nature of the Western Sahara problem; (c) the inclusion of a provision for the rental of premises as all offices in the Secretariat will move to a new location during 2009; and (d) increase in the provision for security and interpretation services related to the higher number of negotiation meetings planned by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General during 2010.

89. The projected unencumbered balance of $718,400 in the period 2008-2009 is mainly owed to the position of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara being vacant from August 2008 until December 2008. During the interim period, there were no formal meetings, no trips to the region and lesser activities within the Office of the Personal Envoy.

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field/ Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**1**	—	—	**1**	—	—	—	**1**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	**1**	—	—	**1**	—	—	—	**1**
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

90. The staffing requirement for the Office of the Personal Envoy for 2010 will remain unchanged.

E. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

($695,000)

Background, mandate and objective

91. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had decided to appoint Terje Roed-Larsen as his Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), in order to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the Special Envoy consults with the Government of Lebanon and other interested Member States to assist the

Secretary-General in the preparation of semi-annual reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.

92. In his report to the Security Council dated 26 October 2005 (S/2005/673), the Secretary-General concluded that a number of operational requirements derived from the resolution had been met, among them the withdrawal of forces of the Syrian Arab Republic from Lebanon. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed, and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and improving the relations between the two countries, thus contributing positively to stability in the region, and urged both parties to make efforts through further bilateral dialogue to that end.

93. In August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon; and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

94. Since the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004), the parties concerned have made significant progress towards its implementation. However, the provision calling for the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory and strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government has not yet been fully implemented. Moreover, the provision calling for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias has not been implemented. Meanwhile, it should be noted that since September 2008, the Lebanese leaders have engaged in a National Dialogue to address these very issues.

95. On 15 October 2008, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic established diplomatic relations in fulfilment of resolution 1680 (2006). During the spring of 2009, the two countries exchanged ambassadors. While there has been significant progress, the provisions of resolution 1680 (2006) are yet to be fully implemented.

96. The Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, who informs the Special Envoy on a regular basis about political developments in Lebanon and carries out ad hoc political missions on the ground with the Special Envoy. Furthermore, the Special Coordinator, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process provide logistical support for the trips of the Special Envoy to the Middle East.

97. In 2010, the Secretary-General intends to continue his efforts to encourage the relevant parties to make further progress towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), in the best interests of stability in the region. In particular, he will urge all Lebanese leaders to approach the National Dialogue in a spirit of cooperation and to exert every effort towards a positive and concrete outcome that formalizes the Government of Lebanon's monopoly over the use of force within the country's boundaries and generates progress towards the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias consistent with Security Council resolutions and the Taif Agreement. The Secretary-General remains keenly mindful that this process is complex and has regional ramifications.

98. The mandate of this special political mission will be deemed completed when the Security Council certifies that its resolution 1559 (2004) has been fully implemented.

99. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Office of the Special Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To implement fully Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related decisions of the Council.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
(a) Facilitation of strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory	(a) (i) Absence of land, air and sea violations *Performance measures*: Number of interactions with relevant parties 2008: 25 interactions Estimate 2009: 26 to 30 interactions Target 2010: 30 to 35 interactions (ii) Facilitation of increased extension of authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory, in particular along its borders *Performance measures*: Number of interactions with relevant parties 2008: 25 interactions Estimate 2009: 26 to 30 interactions Target 2010: 30 to 35 interactions (iii) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon

(b) Facilitation of the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias	(b) (i) Increased accession by the Government of Lebanon to the right to exercise a monopoly on the use of force throughout its territory *Performance measures*: Number of interactions with relevant parties 2008: 25 interactions Estimate 2009: 26 to 30 interactions Target 2010: 30 to 35 interactions (ii) Support by the Special Envoy that no individual or groups other than the official armed forces carry arms, taking into account the regular sessions of the national dialogue *Performance measures*: Number of interactions with relevant parties 2008: 25 interactions Estimate 2009: 26 to 30 interactions Target 2010: 30 to 35 interactions (iii) Support by the Special Envoy for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias operating in Lebanon, taking into account the convening of the national dialogue, while upholding the previous dialogue decisions with respect to Palestinian arms within and outside the camps *Performance measures*: Number of interactions with relevant parties 2008: 25 interactions Estimate 2009: 26 to 30 interactions Target 2010: 30 to 35 interactions
(c) Facilitation in support of a strengthened response by all Member States to the remaining provisions of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006)	(c) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts to implement the remaining provisions of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006), taking into account significant progress made in this respect *Performance measures*: Number of interactions with relevant parties 2008: 25 interactions Estimate 2009: 26 to 30 interactions Target 2010: 30 to 35 interactions

Outputs

- Regular meetings of the Special Envoy with representatives of the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments
- Support for the Government of Lebanon in the implementation of the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular through good offices
- Support for the Lebanese national dialogue related to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militias, in particular through meetings with the Government of Lebanon
- Facilitation of dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority and the Government of Lebanon on the disbanding and disarmament of Palestinian militias, in particular through meetings with the PLO/Palestinian Authority and good offices between the PLO and the Government of Lebanon
- Good offices and consultations with all foreign Governments that might have influence on the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon to assist in implementing the requirements of relevant Security Council resolutions in a peaceful manner
- Good offices and consultations with the Governments of Lebanon and States in the region and related statements of the President of the Council
- Good offices and facilitation of bilateral and multilateral dialogue between Lebanon and States in the region and related statements of the President of the Council
- Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (2)

External factors

100. The objective and expected accomplishments would be achieved on the assumption that (a) there is political stability and security in Lebanon; (b) hostilities in the region and in the country are not resumed; (c) there is political goodwill on the part of the parties concerned; (d) the political goodwill of Member States has a positive influence on the parties concerned; and (e) there are no tensions between Lebanon and States in the region.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008-31 December 2009 variance			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
	Appropriations	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2009*	*Variance*
Category of expenditure	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	466.7	455.7	11.0	275.3	—	257.3	18.0
Operational costs	1 075.9	742.7	333.2	419.7	—	594.7	(175.0)
Total requirements	**1 542.6**	**1 198.4**	**344.2**	**695.0**	**—**	**852.0**	**(157.0)**

101. The estimated requirements for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) for a one-year period

ending 31 December 2010 amount to $695,000 net ($739,300 gross). This would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of three existing positions ($275,300), official travel ($327,700), facilities and infrastructure ($42,900), ground transportation ($1,000), communications ($39,900), information technology ($6,700) and other supplies, services and equipment ($1,500).

102. The decreased requirements of $157,000 in 2010 are mainly owed to the reduced requirements for official travel, ground transportation, communications, and other supplies and services as most of the logistical requirements by the Special Envoy in the region are expected to be provided at no cost by other United Nations agencies.

103. The projected unencumbered balance of $344,200 in the biennium 2008-2009 is owed mainly to the fewer number of trips undertaken and the consultancy services not utilized due to the volatile security situation in Lebanon.

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Total***	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2009	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Proposed 2010	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	**2**	—	1	**3**	—	—	—	**3**
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

104. The total staffing requirements for the Office for 2010 will remain unchanged.

F. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region

($3,042,000)

Background, mandate and objective

105. The General Assembly in its resolution 63/291 approved the budget of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region for the six-month period from 1 July to 31 December 2009, included in the budget of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for 2009-2010, as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its related report (A/63/746/Add.16). In paragraph 48 of its report, the Advisory Committee expressed its view that, notwithstanding the explanations provided, the functions of the Special Envoy and the activities of the Office, by their nature, are more closely aligned with those of a special political mission. It therefore recommends that consideration be given to establishing the Office as a special political mission. Furthermore, according to the information provided to the Committee, the Special Envoy reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Accordingly, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region is established as a special political mission from 1 January 2010.

106. The continued presence of foreign and Congolese armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is the main source of the perennial conflict in that area. It has also cast a shadow over the significant progress achieved in recent years towards attaining overall peace and security in the Great Lakes region. Concerted efforts by national, regional and international actors have led to agreement on a number of instruments to address the challenges posed by the armed groups, who continue to undermine the authority of the State, exploit the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, wreak havoc on the population and threaten to expand the conflict to the wider region. Continued activities by the armed groups have caused the death of thousands of civilians, posed specific threats to particular population groups, and led to the displacement of millions of people in the subregion.

107. The Nairobi and Goma processes together provide a viable framework for resolving, in a comprehensive and balanced manner, the political, military and socio-economic problems facing the Kivu provinces. The Nairobi Communiqué of November 2007 seeks to address the issue of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) while the Statements of commitments (*Actes d'engagement*), signed in Goma in January 2008, provide a comprehensive political process for Nkunda's Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) and other armed groups from North and South Kivu. The lack of meaningful progress in implementation under the Nairobi and Goma frameworks is owed to the lack of effective political will of the parties and their failure, on occasion, to act in good faith. It has been further exacerbated by the lack of confidence between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, as well as the severely limited capacity of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).

108. Lack of progress in the implementation of the Nairobi and Goma agreements led in August 2008 to the resumption of large-scale hostility between FARDC and CNDP. Despite all efforts, including the development of a comprehensive disengagement plan by MONUC, there was dangerous escalation in the fighting after CNDP started its major offensive on 25 October 2008. Meanwhile, the knock-on effects of the conflict in North Kivu have reignited the persistent threat of armed groups in Ituri, and threaten a still fragile peace in South Kivu. There has also been a recent resurgence of activities by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Haut-Uélé province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

109. By its presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/40) of 29 October 2008, the Security Council strongly supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and encouraged him to send a special envoy tasked with this mission as soon as possible. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council in his letter dated 3 November 2008 (S/2008/684) of his intention to appoint Olusegun Obasanjo as his Special Envoy for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (Great Lakes region). In his letter dated 5 November 2008 (S/2008/685), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Security Council had taken note of his intention.

110. In addition, the Security Council expressed its full support for the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and co-facilitator Benjamin Mkapa, as referenced in its resolutions 1843 (2008) and 1856 (2008).

111. Immediately after their appointments, the Special Envoy and the co-facilitator engaged in a series of consultations with Heads of State in the region. The Special Envoy also met with the then leader of CNDP, Laurent Nkunda, whose well-organized and equipped forces were gaining ground rapidly and were about to capture Goma, the capital of North Kivu. The consultations led to a ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and CNDP, improved humanitarian access, and the opening of official talks in Nairobi on 8 December. Behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy of the co-facilitators also helped in the rapprochement of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, which agreed to address issues of common interest under a formal bilateral ministerial framework.

112. Following months of talks under the auspices of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, three separate peace agreements were signed on 23 March 2009, namely between (a) the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and CNDP; (b) the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and North Kivu armed groups; and (c) the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Kivu armed groups. While the implementation process started slowly, it gained speed progressively as a direct result of pressure exerted on the parties by the Special Envoy. In early May 2009, a national follow-up committee was established to oversee the implementation of the agreements. The parties also agreed that the Special Envoy and the co-facilitator will constitute the international follow-up committee mandated to assist the Congolese in the implementation of the agreements. The Congolese Parliament passed an amnesty law on 7 May. In addition to the release of a number of its political prisoners, CNDP was also granted legal accreditation to become a political party. Almost all other former armed groups are now in a process of changing their status.

113. In the coming months, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and his co-facilitator will focus their efforts on helping the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region as a whole to consolidate and sustain the gains made so far in the peace process. The Special Envoy and his team plan to undertake the following activities: (a) to liaise with the parties and other key stakeholders (including MONUC) and closely monitor the effective implementation of the agreements through regular assessment visits to Kinshasa, Goma and other points, as necessary; (b) to further promote the strengthening of the rapprochement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda; (c) to engage leaders in the broader region and assist the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in developing a framework for the implementation of the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region; and (d) to ensure the early implementation of those aspects of the Pact related to the mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General. For the remainder of 2009, and given the current pace of the implementation process and the positive regional political dynamics, it is expected that (a) at least 60 per cent of the provisions of the 23 March agreements will be implemented; (b) Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will have completely restored their diplomatic relationships; and (c) the implementation of at least two peace/security-related projects of the 2006 ICGLR Pact will have begun.

114. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region are presented below.

Objective: To consolidate the peace dividends arising from the 23 March agreements.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
(a) Implementation of the 23 March agreements concluded between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and CNDP, and other armed groups in North and South Kivu	(a) (i) Number of armed groups signatories of the Agreements transformed into political parties, including CNDP *Performance measures*: Number of armed groups Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 3 Target 2010: 10 (ii) Establishment of a Government committee to take care of war victims: wounded and orphans *Performance measures*: Number of Government committees Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: not applicable Target 2010: 1 (iii) Number of conciliation committees in place and operational to help in the safe return of IDPs and refugees *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: not applicable Estimate 2009: 2 Target 2010: 10 (iv) Decreased number of displaced civilians and refugees in North Kivu *Performance measures*: Actual 2008: 250,000 Estimate 2009: 150,000 Target 2010: 105,000

(b) Normalized and strengthened relations among countries in Great Lakes region normalized and strengthened, including between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and a comprehensive political framework agreed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and other concerned parties within which the challenge of FDLR can be addressed

(b) (i) Extraordinary regional summits on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to be held under the ICGLR framework

Performance measures:

Actual 2008: 1

Estimate 2009: 1

Target 2010: 2

(ii) Fully restored diplomatic relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda are fully restored through the exchange of ambassadors and the creation of a joint economic commission

Performance measures:

Actual 2008: not applicable

Estimate 2009: yes

Target 2010: yes

(iii) Increased number of repatriated or surrendered FDLR combatants

Performance measures:

Number of FDLR

Actual 2008: not applicable

Estimate 2009: 1,000 repatriated or surrendered

Target 2010: 2,000 repatriated or surrendered

(iv) Viable peace and security projects created in support of the implementation of the 2006 ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability and Development

Performance measures:

Number of projects

Actual 2008: not applicable

Estimate 2009: 2 peace/security-related projects of the 2006 ICGLR Pact will have begun implementation

Target 2010: 2 peace/security-related projects of the 2006 ICGLR Pact will continue to be implemented

Outputs

- Security Council briefings (3)
- Working sessions of the national follow-up committee and the international follow-up committee (7)
- Regional consultations carried out (8)
- Consultations with donors and other international actors carried out (4)
- Public statements on progress of the dialogue on the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (4)
- Formal meetings between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda (4)
- ICGLR summit declarations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2)

External factors

115. The objectives would be achieved, provided that there are: (a) sustained commitment of the parties to implement fully the 23 March agreements; (b) sustained political will to strengthen regional relations; (c) sustained political will to commit the necessary resources for the facilitation efforts and the political follow-up of the implementation process; (d) donor support for the implementation of agreements concluded; and (e) regional support, including from the United Nations Office at Nairobi and MONUC.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2008-31 December 2009 variance			*Requirements for 2010*		*Variance analysis 2009-2010*	
	Appropriations	*Estimated expenditures*	*Savings (deficit)*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Total requirements 2009*	*Variance*
Category of expenditure	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*		*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)=(4)-(6)*
Civilian personnel costs	—	—	—	1 221.4	—	—	1 221.4
Operational costs	—	—	—	1 820.6	27.1	—	1 820.6
Total requirements	—	—	—	**3 042.0**	**27.1**	—	**3 042.0**

116. The budget for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region from 1 July to 31 December 2009, included in the MONUC budget, amounts to $1,175,300 net ($1,244,700 gross).

117. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region for 2010 amount to $3,042,000 net ($3,232,800 gross). This amount would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the proposed establishment of 14 positions ($1,221,400), consultants ($630,000), travel of staff ($259,800), facilities and infrastructure ($149,200), ground transportation ($117,700), air transportation ($377,300), communications ($186,400), information technology ($25,300), medical ($5,900) and other supplies, services and equipments ($89,000).

Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									*General Service and related category*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	*Total*	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Grand total***
Approved 2009	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Proposed 2010	1	1	—	—	2	1	2	—	7	3	—	**10**	—	4	—	**14**
Change	**1**	**1**	—	—	**2**	**1**	**2**	—	**7**	**3**	—	**10**	—	**4**	—	**14**

118. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region is the most senior official responsible for the implementation of the 23 March agreements. The following positions are being proposed for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes Region in 2010:

(a) Eight substantive positions: the Special Envoy (USG), Senior Special Adviser (ASG), Special Assistant to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (P-5), Chief of Staff (P-5), Political Affairs Officer and Special Assistant to the Senior Special Adviser (P-4), Political Affairs/Reporting Officer (P-3), Personal Assistant of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (Field Service), and Administrative Assistant (Field Service);

(b) Two security positions: Security Protection Coordination Officer (P-3) and Close Protection Team Leader (Field Service);

(c) Four administrative positions: one Administrative Assistant (General Service (Local level)) and three Drivers (General Service (Local level)).

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; GS, General Service; LL, Local level; USG, Under-Secretary-General.